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This article investigates regulatory impact on decisions of companies to go public
and raise capital in the Croatian capital market. It questions the regulatory decision
of mandatory shares listing, brought in 2002, whose aim was to encourage compa-
nies of certain size of shareholders’ equity to enter the capital market. The effect of
mandatory shares listing on further capital raising in public by companies has been
analysed by means of secondary data and survey-based answers of their chief
ﬁnancial ofﬁcers. Financing policies of voluntarily and mandatorily listed ﬁrms were
compared for statistical differences. The research results have shown that mandatory
listing of shares in the capital market has not spurred public companies to issue
securities and raise funds in the capital market thereafter.
Keywords: mandatory shares listing; public companies; subsequent securities
offerings; Croatian capital market
JEL codes: G32, K22, O16.
1. Introduction
Capital markets are designed to enable companies to raise funds and achieve ﬁnancial
ﬂexibility. The research has shown that more transparent companies are able to raise
funds at more favourable terms in the ﬁnancial market (Francis, Khurana, & Pereira,
2005). Companies raise funds by issuing and selling shares to investors in the process
of initial public offering, as well as in subsequent offerings of securities. Two of the
most frequent ﬁnancial instruments issued are shares and corporate bonds.
Shares listing in the chosen capital market follows the complicated procedure of ini-
tial public offering that is beyond the scope of this article. When shares are listed in the
market, the trading begins. From that moment on, the company is obliged to comply
with the listing rules of the capital market. The subsequent obligations of the issuers
mostly rely on the timely publication of their ﬁnancial statements and other relevant
information of interest to investors.
Much literature has been devoted to the role of the capital markets in the economy
(Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 1996; Levine & Zervos, 1998; Stiglitz, 1989); mandatory
and voluntary disclosure of public companies (Botosan, 2000; Chen, Chen, & Wei,
2004; Pervan, 2009; Sengupta, 1998); principles of corporate governance enforcement
(Berglöf & Pajuste, 2005; Roe, 2003; Schmidt & Tyrell, 1997), and the relation between
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ownership and performance of publicly listed companies (Džanić, 2012; Kim,
Kitsabunnarat, & Nosﬁnger, 2004; Kutsuna, Okamura, & Cowling, 2002; Mikkelson,
Partch, & Shah, 1997). From the stance of the issuers, the literature deals with various
motives of primarily shares issuance. However, scarce studies examine the effect of
mandatory listing of shares (Claessens, Djankov, & Klingebiel, 2000). The latter was
the practice of some transition countries whose companies went through ownership
transformation phase in the 1990s.
Some recent studies discuss the impact of privatisation on capital market develop-
ment in transition countries. Fungáčová (2005), for example, empirically conﬁrmed a
negative impact of mass privatisation on capital market development in the medium
term. According to Fungáčová (2005), liquidity indicators showed that most shares were
traded only occasionally or not at all and that capital markets did not fulﬁl their main
economic function of providing capital to enterprises. Minovic (2012) showed that
Croatian market suffers from severe illiquidity, whereby daily liquidity depends on share
trading of the several biggest companies on the stock exchange. Denčić-Mihajlov
(2009) emphasised weaknesses in corporate governance of public companies that were
forced to mandatorily list their shares in Serbia. The consequences were acceleration in
ownership concentration, many low-quality and low-liquidity shares in the market,
insigniﬁcant roles of institutional investors in corporate governance and distortion of the
key functions of the capital market. In the Czech Republic and Lithuania mandatory list-
ing rules eventually caused delisting of shares of numerous companies as they were not
suitable for trading due to small issue size, too small free ﬂoat or intransparency
(Claessens, Lee, & Zechner, 2003). Due to the lack of data, the available research is
mostly limited to macroeconomic indicators of capital market development such as
market capitalisation, market capitalisation to GDP or market capitalisation to bank asset
ratio.
The motives to list the shares in the market can be described from the issuers’
perspective as well as from the perspective of the owners (founders) of the compa-
nies. Broadly speaking, the main motives to list shares from the issuing company’s
stance are raising funds for corporate development (Mikkelson et al., 1997) or repu-
tation strengthening (Röell, 1996). The owners’ motives are to collect as much
money as possible and diversify the risk of their investment (Geddes, 2003). The
surveys on issuers’ motives to list the shares in the market are mostly related to
developed capital markets. Various authors bound the listing motives of issuers either
to initial public offerings or to subsequent securities offerings, i.e. capital raising,
whereas mandatory listing of shares is only bound to the capital market development
of certain transition countries (Berglöf & Pajuste, 2005). The aim of this article is
to partly ﬁll in this research gap. As far as I am aware, it is the ﬁrst article that
analyses legal enforcement of shares listing in the capital market from the issuers’
stance, especially with regard to the consequences of such a regulatory decision on
further issuances of securities by public companies.
The research goal in this article was to investigate whether publicly listed companies
subsequently raise funds in the Croatian capital market and whether there has been a
difference between the voluntarily and mandatorily listed ﬁrms in terms of their prone-
ness to raise funds in the market. The initial assumption that there is a difference in
subsequent securities offerings between voluntarily and mandatorily listed ﬁrms is the
main research hypothesis of the article.
This manuscript is organised in ﬁve parts. A selected literature review on the role of
capital markets in enabling ﬁnancing to the listed companies and the main motives of
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listing shares in the market is given in the introductory part. Section 2 deals with shares
listing rules in the Croatian capital market and gives a brief overview of the market
activity. Subsequent offerings of securities by corporate issuers based on collected sec-
ondary data are described in section 3. The core part of the article is section 4 which
analyses the survey data on CFOs’ stances on subsequent securities offerings in the
Croatian capital market. The last section concludes.
2. Shares listing rules and a brief overview of the Croatian capital market
The Zagreb stock exchange (ZSE) was established in 1907 but, like in other transition
countries, was closed in the period of planned economy functioning. It was
re-established in 1991 after Croatia declared its independence from former Yugoslavia.
Parallel with the ofﬁcial market, the ZSE, the over-the-counter market called Varaždin
Securities Market was established in 1993. The latter transformed into the second stock
exchange in Croatia in 2002 (Varaždin stock exchange [VSE]) that existed until it was
joined to the ZSE in late 2006. In the period of two stock exchanges existence, most
issuers had their stocks listed on both stock exchanges.
In the early 1990s the Croatian capital market was rather unregulated and served pri-
vatisation purposes. In that phase the listing of companies was voluntary like in many
transition countries that went through ownership transformation phase, such as Estonia,
Latvia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia (Claessens et al., 2000). The data on mandatory
and voluntary listing of shares provided by these authors are widely cited elsewhere.
The adoption of the Law on Securities Market in mid-2002 marked the turning point
in the Croatian capital market development. The listing of shares became mandatory not
only for privatised companies, but for all companies regardless of their ownership struc-
ture. The law obliged established Croatian companies having more than 30 million kuna
shareholders’ capital1 or more than 100 shareholders to list their shares in the capital
market by mid-2003, regardless of whether they had planned to have initial public offer-
ing of their shares in the near future or not. The law also obliged all companies whose
shares were or would be traded publicly to make their prospectuses public and available
through Internet pages of the ZSE. The prospectuses should comprise the data on the
issuer (ﬁnancial reports for two previous years, company growth projection, ownership
structure of the company, expectations on speciﬁc, industry, economy and ﬁnancial mar-
ket developments and risks) and the data on the shares issued (amount of paid-in capi-
tal, number of stocks available for trading, rights and obligations of shareholders).
Although the companies started to list their shares in the capital market, especially
during the ﬁrst half of 2003, it was the listing of secondary shares that were previously
mainly kept in corporate treasuries. Stock listings were not followed by capital inﬂow
either to the owners or to the companies.
The stock exchanges followed the regulatory path in establishing shares listing rules,
by allowing the companies to list their shares even if less than 5% of the stake in
companies had been publicly held. The regulation on the mandatory listing of shares
was stronger than stock exchange listing rules which are presented in Table 1 in
chronological order.
The ZSE and the VSE could only distinguish between companies with high and low
free ﬂoat by letting them list shares into different market quotations. The ofﬁcial market
was the strictest, requiring public companies to have a minimum of 25% of shares avail-
able for public trading. However, the number of companies whose shares were listed in
the ﬁrst quotation has been very low. It climbed to eight on the ZSE before stock
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exchanges reunion, and after the merger of the stock exchanges has gradually reached
20 at the end of 2010. Regulatory and discretionary rules brought in by stock exchanges
on the minimum number of shareholders and minimum free ﬂoat for the ofﬁcial market
and regular market simply did not go together. For this reason some shares were very
illiquid from the ﬁrst day of listing. As a consequence of such soft rules, most
companies that listed shares on one or both stock exchanges have had a small free ﬂoat,
calculated as a share of freely traded shares in total number of shares issued. A sudden
increase in market capitalisation of newly listed companies offered a false impression of
the Croatian capital market development at the time. Mandatory listings and interest of
some institutional investors such as investment and pension funds provoked temporarily
vivid trading with some issues. The data illustrated in Figure 1 show the explosion in
the average daily turnover (measured as the number of shares traded times traded share
price in million kuna) and the number of listed shares, accompanied with the rising
market prices, as evidenced by the value of ofﬁcial stock exchange index – Crobex. But
when liquidity dried out in the beginning of the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008, the prices of
listed shares have fallen to unrealistically low levels. The falling market trend was cou-
pled with a massive delisting of shares from the ZSE.
The ﬁrst law on investment funds was enacted in 1995, while the three-pillar
pension reform commenced in 2002. With certain restrictions, investment funds could
heavily invest into domestic stocks. The restrictions to mandatory pension funds regard-
ing the domestic shares’ purchase were limited to few shares in the ﬁrst (ofﬁcial) quota-
tion until 2007. After that, they were allowed to purchase shares from other quotations
provided that little free ﬂoat is offset by higher market capitalisation. However, neither




































































Average daily turnover in million kuna CROBEX Total number of listed shares
Figure 1. Total number of listed shares, CROBEX, and average daily turnover of shares in
million kuna on the ZSE, 1997–2010.
Source: Author’s illustration based on the data from the ZSE.
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by the listed Croatian companies. In addition, the capital market has seen only seven
initial public offerings (IPOs) from 2006–2008, two of which were partial privatisations.
3. Subsequent offerings of securities in the Croatian capital market
One of the primary motives to issue shares by IPO and list them in the market is to
achieve ﬁnancial ﬂexibility, i.e. to enable subsequent offerings of securities under more
favourable terms (Pagano, Panetta, & Zingales, 1998). Subsequent securities offerings
are primarily considered as offerings of additional shares and corporate bonds. Croatian
example shows that commercial papers, regardless of being money market instruments,
are also listed in the capital market. Due to the possibility of additional tranche issu-
ances under the same commercial paper programme, commercial papers are also consid-
ered in additional securities offerings. Whereas public companies are allowed to choose
between subsequent shares, bonds and commercial papers offers, private companies can
issue long-term and short-term debt instruments only.
Croatian law enables issuers to raise capital by the public offering of shares or by
private placement – with or without prospectus issuance. Experience has shown that
companies more frequently engage into private placements of securities (Table 2). The
data in the ﬁrst column of Table 2 show that after the adoption of the mandatory listing
rule in mid-2002, total shareholders’ capital raised by the real sector of economy by
public shares offering in the market was barely exceeding 80 million kuna. However,
the ofﬁcial statistics takes into account registered capital only, excluding any capital
gains resulting from a higher selling price that might have been achieved in the process
of shares offering to the market. For this reason the reported capital raised by the
companies is underestimated.
Overall, the ﬁnancial sector was more active in raising capital compared to the real
sector of the economy in the entire period of 1997–2010. Unfortunately, the separate
data for private offerings without prospectus for the real and ﬁnancial sector are not
available after 2006. The private placements of securities with or without prospectuses
had more than a 95% share in total shares offerings of 32.5 billion kuna. Initial public
offerings of shares were done by companies that willingly offered and listed their shares
in the market during the one-off IPO boom beginning at the end of 2005, with public
offer of shares of VIRO Sugar Factory (VIRO tvornica šećera d.d.) and ending with
public offer of shares of Optima telecom in early 2008.2 The latter is calculated in the
ofﬁcial statistics after the supervisory agency’s approval of the offering prospectus in
2007. These IPOs took place in the period of rising market prices and have beneﬁtted
from positive sentiment of investors surrounding two privatisations of the shares of pet-
rol and gas company – INA d.d. in late 2006 and national telecom – HT d.d. in the
autumn of 2007.3 None of the companies that listed their shares due to legal obligation
has been involved into subsequent public offering of its shares. Historically, the issuers
that raised most capital in the market up to 2006 by public offerings of securities were
Pliva d.d. (taken over by Actavis in 2008 and TEVA thereafter) and Podravka d.d. Both
companies listed their shares willingly in the 1990s.
The corporate bond market is also dominated by issuers that voluntarily listed their
shares, with three IPO participants from the ﬁrst and the only one IPO wave in the Croat-
ian capital market so far, as is shown in Table 3. It is evident that all three IPO participants
tested the appetite of investors by bonds offering prior to the IPO of their shares. Public
companies had a 26.4% share in total corporate bonds issuances to the public, denomi-
nated in kuna from 1999–2010 and almost a 70% a share in euro-denominated corporate
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bond issuances. The rest of the capital was raised by the companies in private. Regardless
of the offering method, the secondary corporate bond market has had very thin liquidity, if
any. The bonds have been mostly held by investors to their maturity, if they were not
called off earlier by the issuer.
Due to numerous tranches of commercial papers issued so far, the manually
calculated data might be prone to error, but a general observation is that most public
and private companies that had either public offerings of shares or corporate bonds have
also been active in the commercial paper market. In addition to bond issuers that issue
commercial papers, which are marked by two asterisks in Table 3, public companies
that appear to be more or less active in commercial paper market have been Dalekovod,
Petrokemija, Lura, Kraš, Atlantska plovidba, IGH, Varteks and Istraturist. However,
commercial papers are primarily offered and written by institutional investors in private
placements. Public offers of commercial papers were only conducted by Plava laguna,
Pliva and Podravka. All three issuers listed their shares into the capital market in the
1990s. The ﬁrst company is from tourism while the latter two represent manufacturing
sector.
4. Research methodology and results
Research hypothesis. There is a difference between the proneness to capital raising in
the market between the mandatorily and voluntarily listed companies.
A survey of public companies CFOs from real sector of Croatian economy was con-
ducted in the ﬁrst quarter of 2010 with the aim of examining whether raising funds by
public companies in the market is related to their motive of listing. In other words, the
research goal was to analyse whether the issuers, once their shares are listed in the mar-
ket, use the opportunity to raise the capital in subsequent shares offerings.4
The response rate was 32%, meaning that 48 out of 150 CFOs of public companies
returned the ﬁlled-in questionnaire. The survey was targeted to the representatives of the
real sector of the economy. It is because the banks, as the largest ﬁnancial institutions in
the country, have mostly had private offerings of securities to fulﬁl the regulatory capital
adequacy requirements. Furthermore, earlier research has shown that ﬁnancial institu-
tions are generally interested in investing funds into domestic corporate bonds (Miloš,
2004).
Seventy-seven percent of CFOs responded that their companies listed shares in the
market due to legal obligation. For the remaining 23% of issuers, the main motives of
listing were: raising funds, lowering costs of ﬁnance and achieving better reputation
(45% of voluntarily listed ﬁrms or 10% of the entire sample) followed by ﬁnancial ﬂexi-
bility, market valuation and existing owners’ exit (36% of voluntarily listed ﬁrms or
8.3% of the entire sample). Companies that listed their shares purely due to regulatory
reasons were 63-years-old on average while those that listed their shares willingly were
21 years younger. Pearson chi-square statistics was used to compare the differences
between mandatorily and voluntarily publicly listed ﬁrms.
As evidenced in Table 4, the sample covered 48 public companies from 12 counties,
whereby the companies from the City of Zagreb are represented most (35%). This data
is in line with Zagreb city registered companies shares in total population of stock-
exchange listed companies in Croatia. Mandatory shares listing in coastal counties
(Zadar, Split-Dalmatia, Dubrovnik-Neretva, Istria county) was primarily bound to the
reputable companies from the tourism sector, while companies from manufacturing busi-
ness come mostly from City of Zagreb and Zagreb county. Two thirds of answers were
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received from the non-manufacturing sector that is slightly higher than overall share of
non-manufacturing businesses from real sector of the economy in the entire population
of publicly listed ﬁrms. The Pearson chi-square test conﬁrmed a 5% signiﬁcant differ-
ence in the number of shareholders between mandatorily and non-mandatorily listed
ﬁrms. The majority of companies that mandatorily listed their shares on the stock
exchange had between 100 and 1000 shareholders, while some that listed their shares
earlier had a larger number of shareholders. Companies with a smaller number of share-
holders were listed due to large shareholders’ capital threshold. Most companies that
had other reasons for listing had a smaller number of shareholders – up to 100, while
some CFOs cited a much larger number, probably due to shares allocations to workers
before listing.
When asked to estimate the effect of listing, CFOs chose between positive, negative
and neutral effects. Sixty-four percent of ﬁrms that listed their shares willingly had a
positive perception of the effect of listing, while 73% of mandatory listed ﬁrms had
neutral stance towards listing effect. Therefore, the Pearson chi-square test caught a sig-
niﬁcant difference between the subsamples at 5% level (Pearson chi-square
value = 7.807). With regard to particular subjective stances on listing, respondents were
offered ﬁve answers on a Likert scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly
agree). The column ‘no answer’ was deliberately put in as an indicator for absence of
any attitude. The statistics of the received answers is presented in Figures 2 to 4.
Only seven CFOs cited that their costs of ﬁnancing decreased after the listing, as
illustrated in Figure 2, while seven issuers did not want to answer or were undecided.
For almost 70% of issuers, the costs of ﬁnancing remained unchanged after the listing.
As evidenced in Figure 3, six companies only achieved better shares liquidity. It con-
ﬁrmed the fact that the free ﬂoat of Croatian companies is too small on average, particu-
larly for mandatorily listed ﬁrms. The most important effect was management reward
related to the achieved business results after shares listing that was cited by almost 30%
CFOs in Figure 4. A 10% signiﬁcant statistical difference between voluntarily and
mandatorily listed ﬁrms was spotted with management reward and better shares liquid-
ity. However, in almost 80% of companies that went public due to legal obligation,

































Answers according to the type of listing
voluntary listing law obligation
Figure 2. Cost of capital decrease after the listing.
Source: Survey results.
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Eighty-six percent of mandatorily listed companies do not prefer any capital market
instrument, as opposed to 27% voluntarily listed ﬁrms (statistical difference between
subsamples is signiﬁcant at 1% level with Pearson chi-square value at 23.038). Only
four companies had subsequent experience with securities issuance after the listing –
three from voluntary listing and only one ﬁrm from mandatory listing, conﬁrming the
results from collected secondary data. When asked to comment on reasons, the usual
answers were that: the number of transactions in the market is too small; there is no
market interest to invest in low-proﬁt sectors; legal requirements caused only additional
work, and so on. Statistical tests conﬁrmed that there are no signiﬁcant differences
between the two subsamples with regard to the illiquidity of shares and corporate bond
market, listing maintenance costs, complicated procedure of securities issuance, lack of
investors in the market and belief on unrealistic market prices. CFOs wrote that trans-



































Answers according to the type of listing
voluntary listing law obligation



































Answers according to the type of listing
voluntary listing law obligation
Figure 4. Management reward after the listing.
Source: Survey results.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1092 M. Grubišić Šeba
enabling easier access to capital. These answers are in line with the number of ﬁrms that
prefer capital market instruments for ﬁnancing and are also in line with the results of
capital costs decrease after the listing. However, the preference for capital market
ﬁnancing did not result in subsequent securities issuance.
One goal of the survey was to reveal whether the ﬁnancing policies of the enter-
prises that mandatorily listed their shares differ from the ﬁnancing policies of enterprises
that have done it voluntarily and what ﬁnancing policies could be expected in the
future. Again, as is shown in Table 5, the companies that listed shares in the market
due to their own reasons, have more chance to issue securities again, although this like-
lihood is not very big. It is a matter of concern that 23% of mandatory issuers refused
to declare their attitude on this matter, while at least 31% of them said that they would
not issue securities again.
In addition, the Spearman correlation coefﬁcients shown in Table 6 reveal that law
obligation is signiﬁcantly negatively correlated with preference for capital market instru-
ments issuance, perception on effect of shares listing, additional securities issuance after
the listing as well as with the possibility of shares, corporate bonds and commercial
paper issuance (Table 5). Additional securities issuance after the listing is signiﬁcantly
positively correlated with shares, bonds and commercial paper ﬁnancing and the possi-
bility of ﬁnancing with such instruments. The companies that are likely to issue shares
are also more likely to issue corporate bonds and commercial paper.
5. Conclusion
The research conducted in this article showed that the effect of mandatory shares listing
created only a temporary supply of shares in the market. It is comparable with the
research of Fungáčová (2005), Denčić-Mihajlov (2009) and Minovic (2012). The lack
of securities offerings subsequent to the shares listing has shown that most public com-
panies in Croatia have not even been considering the capital market as a possible way
out of their ﬁnancial problems. Only companies that have either been willingly engaged
into the IPO process or that have listed their shares in the market voluntarily regardless
of the IPO appeared to subsequently offer securities to investors through public offer or
private placement. A few of them have beneﬁted from the rise of the capital market in
2005–2007 and raised funds by either commercial paper and/or corporate bonds
issuance.
Overall, the voluntary issuers of shares had more positive perception on shares list-
ing, while neutral stance prevailed within the group of companies that were legally
obliged to do so. Voluntary shares issuers had also been younger than mandatory shares
issuers, whereby the companies aged 50 and above represented almost 68% of the
mandatory issuers sample. Only one company that listed its shares due to legal obliga-
tion has offered securities to the public after the listing. The percentage of subsequent
securities offerings and establishing management reward scheme according to the busi-
ness results goes, in fact, much more in favour of public companies that listed the
shares due to other reasons, but legal. The results of primary research were supported
by secondary data on additional securities issuance by public companies from real sector
of the economy subsequent to shares listing.
Although the decision on securities offerings is primarily conditional on the will of
the company’s owners and CFOs, the regulation could have done much more to
stimulate additional securities offerings in Croatia. A signiﬁcant problem the regulation
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tolerates is small free ﬂoat of many public companies, which undermines liquidity in
the market. Companies whose shares are listed in the market for fulﬁlling legal obliga-
tion only, companies that do not want to be transparent and companies that are not
ready to make higher number of their shares available for trading do really not have to
be present in the market at all.
Disclosure statement
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. On 25 July 2002, when the law came into force, the ofﬁcial exchange rate of EURHRK was
7,363,046, meaning that 30 million kuna corresponded to 407 million euro of capital.
2. Excluding two companies that were privatised, ﬁve companies undertook IPOs of their shares.
They were: VIRO, Magma, Veterina, Atlantic group and Optima telecom. Two companies
(Magma and Atlantic group) came from retail trade and distribution, VIRO and Veterina rep-
resented manufacturing sector, while Optima telecom was from telecommunications sector.
3. d.d. is a Croatian abbreviation for public limited company, i.e. plc.
4. The survey was also targeted to the companies in private, but this survey results are not dis-
closed in this article, although the stances of CFOs of the companies in public and the
companies in private are mutually comparable.
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